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ABSTRACT: Since the beginning of the 
1990’s several models of privatization have 
been applied in Serbia. While much was 
written concerning the models themselves 
at the time of their application, remarkably 
little has been written in regards to the 
assessment of their implementation over 
the last decade. The paper investigates the 
scope, types, and results, with an emphasis 
on this time period. Given that the official 
failure rate of privatizations undertaken 
is around one in four, the paper focuses on 
the weaknesses of the legal and economic 
aspects of the model, the weaknesses of 
the privatisation implementation, and 
the weaknesses in the monitoring of the 
privatization process. Another focus is on 
the inadequate attention paid to the need for 
institutional coherence, which led to results 
that were not in accord with the goals set 
out. The paper will also point out the areas 
of further research that, in the opinion of 
the authors, should be undertaken in order 
to come to an assessment of privatization 
as the central and most important aspect of 
the transition.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The transition in Serbia, of which privatization is surely the centrepiece, went 
through various phases due to many reasons, the most important being the 
wars in the former Yugoslavia and UN sanctions, as well as permanent political 
instability.
When analyzing the process of privatization one should be aware of its 
political ramifications. Indeed, it is our belief that the privatization process is 
predominantly politically determined, with institutions being formed anew to 
achieve political goals. Furthermore, we will argue that the political aspect of 
privatization was the primary factor that led to some or most of the institutional 
failures of privatization in Serbia. Given that privatization in any country 
undergoing transition is a process of large scale property rights transfer, as 
opposed to most privatizations in established market economies, it has long-
term consequences regarding the economic and social structure, thereby creating 
political consequences that may block the completion of the transition process. 
In itself such a state of affairs may lead to prolonged stagnation, for reasons that 
will become apparent.
2. THE HISTORICAL LEGACY
Any student of the Yugoslav system of self-management is well acquainted with 
the hybrid system of a managed market economy with somewhat fuzzy property 
rights. A vast body of literature was produced over the years of the heyday of 
self-management, providing the literature in the field of comparative economic 
systems with both empirical and theoretical works of enduring value (Vanek, 
1970,Estrin,1984). The most important feature of this system was the right of use 
of firms’ funds by the managers and workers’ councils, within the bounds of the 
law and without the right of sale of the firms’ property and assets. It is also well 
known that there were various forms of political control and some elaborate plans 
to introduce a certain degree of planning through so-called ‘social compacts’ 
between firms.Nevertheless, the Yugoslav economy certainly resembled to a high 
degree a true market economy as opposed to a centrally planned economy. After 
all, central planning had been done away with in the 1960’s. 
Therefore, the most important characteristic of the Yugoslav system was that it 
empowered employees and provided them with the belief that they ‘owned’ the 
enterprises that they were employed in. One cannot stress this feature enough, PRIVATISATION IN SERBIA
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as it proved to be the single largest constraint at the beginning of the process of 
privatization. This may sound somewhat contradictory, since the experience of a 
market economy and previous market reforms should have been an advantage for 
proceeding with privatization. In other words, the natural way to proceed would 
have been a model of privatization suited to the political and socioeconomic 
constraints stemming from the social reality inherited at the starting point of the 
privatization process. 
Indeed, the first efforts at privatization were geared in that direction (Zec et 
al,1994).This short-lived effort was primarily aimed at defining property rights; 
that is, at setting up a legal framework for the incorporation of firms in order 
to define property rights, after which a model of insider privatization could be 
applied. The liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization that accompanied 
it, as well as the founding of the stock exchange, were all steps in creating the 
foundations for the privatization process that was to come. In fact, the Act on 
Financial Operations and Laws on Social Capital, passed in 1989, enabled a 
model of insider employee privatization. The shares of enterprises were sold at a 
30% discount to present and former employees. Each year of employment gave 
the workers a 1% discount up to a total maximum discount of 70%. Although this 
approach barely took off, given the deteriorating political situation that turned 
into armed conflict and UN sanctions, some 1,220 enterprises began the process 
of privatization.
Given the conflicts, sanctions, and demise of the Yugoslav federation, all of the 
republics embarked on their own roads to privatization by passing their own laws 
in order to regulate this process. In 1991 Serbia adopted a Law on Conditions 
and Procedures to Transform Collective Property into other Forms of Property. 
This allowed for the privatization of ‘social capital’ and nonstate-owned firms 
whose ownership was ‘transformed’ into ownership by state or local privatization 
authorities. Furthermore, privatization was not mandatory.The approach did 
not stray from the general philosophy of employee privatization, but had more 
restrictive conditions. Employees got a 20% discount, with 1% for each year of 
employment up to a maximum of 60%, with a five-year repayment period. A 
cap on the maximum worth of shares was introduced amounting to the sum of 
DM (Deutsch Mark) 20,000 for individual workers and 30,000 per manager. The 
privatizations begun under the previous law had to adjust to the new legislation.
From August 1991,when this new law came into effect,until the spring of 1994, 
only 668 enterprises had commenced the privatization process. Almost double 
that number had begun the privatization process on the basis of the previous 
federal legislation. In any case, half a million workers became shareholders, with 92
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the overall structure of capital in these firms being 80% private and 20% social 
(Uvalić, 2010, p.65).
The legislation provided for revaluation of capital on a yearly basis. However, due 
to record hyperinflation, the process became a giveaway and became politically 
unacceptable. In fact it was the opposition party (the Democratic Party- under 
the leadership of Đinđić) that proposed amendments on capital revaluation in 
order to rectify the drastic gap being formed between a realistic share value and 
inflationary undervalued company shares. The ruling party (Socialist Party of 
Serbia- under the leadership of Slobodan Milošević) not only adopted these 
amendments but also used the application of revaluation coefficients in such a 
way as to basically annul the whole process. The coefficients grossly overvalued 
social capital, drastically reducing the share of privatized capital. At the end of 
the process enterprises were left with between 1%-40% of private capital, with 
firms that had started the privatization process in 1993 having private ownership 
reduced to 1%-2% of total capital (Vujačić, 1996.pp 398-9). Thus, in effect, the 
whole privatization process up to that point had been reversed or significantly 
set back. There are differing opinions on whether or not this policy was wrong. 
Certainly it led to broad discouragement and great reservations in regards to the 
continuation of privatization. The process was basically halted and compromised. 
Along with this process, a process of nationalizing social capital began with large 
enterprises and public utilities becoming state–owned as opposed to socially-
owned firms.
It is difficult to see how the privatization process could have gone forward under 
the exceptional circumstances of sanctions, war, and hyperinflation without 
breeding extreme and broadly based political resentment. The only realistic 
option in those circumstances would have been to adopt a model of direct or 
indirect giveaway; that is, a model that would have been based on property rights 
transfer. This did not occur. Instead, new privatization legislation was passed in 
1997 (Petrović, J., and Vujačić, I., 1997). 
According to the new law, after valuation 10% of company shares would be 
transferred to the State Pension Fund, after which employees or former employees 
would receive an amount of shares in their companies to the extent of DM 400 
per year of employment, limited to 60% of the total capital. If the limit was not 
reached, any citizen (age 18 or above) could also receive these shares on equal 
terms. The second round would allow employees to purchase shares at a 20% 
discount with an extra 1% discount for each year of employment, up to the limit 
of 60%. Individual employees had the right to purchase these shares up to the PRIVATISATION IN SERBIA
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amount of DM 6000 and with a repayment period of up to six years. Proceeds 
from the sales were to be divided equally between the Pension Fund and the 
Employment Fund, with the remaining 50% going to the Development Fund. 
Unsold shares were to be ascribed to the Shareholder Fund. Only some 400 
enterprises began privatization under the new 1997 legislation. The major reason 
for lack of interest was not only disbelief in the process due to previous revisions 
of legislation and the effective annulment of privatization, but also the exchange 
rate. With the market exchange rate being multiple times over the official rate 
and the evaluation of firms being done at the market rate, there was very little 
incentive for employees to pursue privatization on their own initiative. This went 
on till the very end of the Milošević regime. 
3. THE NEW MODEL
The radical push for privatization began only after the interim government was 
formed after the democratic revolution in October 2000. Between that time and 
the formation of the new government by the Democratic Opposition of Serbia 
(DOS) another 350 enterprises chose to enter the privatization process, bringing 
the total to 778 under the 1997 privatization procedures (Uvalić, 2010, p 97). 
The main reason for this was the exchange rate, which was devalued in order to 
bring it in line with the market rate (at 30 dinars to 1 DM). The other probable 
reason can be found in the uncertainty concerning new privatization legislation. 
Certainly, and with good reason, employees anticipated that the new law on 
privatization would limit their rights and benefits. In other words, the existing 
legislation, along with an exchange rate that would guarantee a decent percentage 
of shares in their firms, gave an extra impetus to employees of relatively solid 
medium sized firms to initiate the privatization process. One should therefore 
keep in mind that most of the firms privatized according to this method belong 
to the group of better performing companies. This must not be neglected when 
evaluating the results of the privatization that followed. At the moment the 
failure rate of privatization since 2001 is high, and would probably be lower if the 
previous privatizations were to be taken into account.
The Privatization Law passed in 2001 was heavily influenced by the leadership’s 
perception of the political nature of the process. Firstly, the privatization 
process was seen as an opportunity for a clean break with the past system of 
self-management and the ensuing models of insider employee privatizations that 
had been judged as inadequate up to that point. Not only were the results seen 
as modest, but also the model itself was seen as a perpetuation of the inherited 94
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system. The model retained the dominant role of insiders, which was seen as an 
impediment to better corporate governance, considered to be of vital importance 
in a fully fledged functioning market economy. The fact that the process of insider 
employee privatizations had been reversed by political action and hindered by a 
lack of employee motivation only confirmed the belief of the reformers that a 
radically different approach was necessary.
Furthermore, privatization was seen as crucial in making the process of reform 
irreversible. In other words, divorce of management and ownership from 
employee management was seen as a definite break with self-managementand 
simultaneously as a blow to past, entrenched interests that could at some point 
rally around the opposition (primarily the socialists and radicals). No matter 
what one may think of self-management (and the democratic opposition had 
been ideologically opposed to it from the beginning) it must not be forgotten that 
the system had been much compromised during the 90s, with the managers in a 
dominant position to abuse social property and quietly strip assets for their own 
benefit, and to provide both material and moral support to the regime.
Finally, having inherited a devastated economy and a country on the verge of 
bankruptcy, the reasons for an approach based on sales were seen as one that 
would enable the recuperation of the state budget. Also, it could provide for 
potential investment in infrastructure and funds for social services. In other 
words, the proceeds could help the functioning of the social safety net in the 
process of transition. It is not surprising, therefore, that the proceeds from 
privatization were to be allocated to the state budget (75%), the Restitution Fund 
(5%), the Pension Fund (10%) and the Infrastructure Fund (10%).
The model based on sales was adopted and provided for two types of sales: 
tenders and auctions. Tenders were to be applied to large enterprises with the 
hope of attracting large foreign strategic investors that would bring know-how, 
efficient management, export markets, and the like. Auctions were meant for 
smaller and medium sized enterprises. Another 75 large enterprises that were 
state owned were meant to undergo restructuring, after which they would be 
privatized through a tender procedure. 
It must be stressed that within the tender process the offered price was not the 
sole determining factor, because future investment, the social programme, and 
the environmental programme were also to be taken into consideration. In itself 
this should not have been problematic, since all of these could be converted to a 
monetary equivalent. The weights to be ascribed could, however, be politically PRIVATISATION IN SERBIA
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motivated, while the fulfilment of obligations needed monitoring and oversight. 
The social programme was supposed to either provide compensation for loss of 
employment or to guarantee the workers employment for a prolonged period 
of time. In this way mass unemployment was to be avoided in the process of 
restructuring after privatization. It was assumed that overall there would be 
around 150-200 tenders so that the processes and outcomes could be controlled. 
In reality the number of tenders (public offerings) was close to 300.
On the other hand the outcome of auctions was to be determined solely by price. 
They were to be transparent, and the hope was that insiders would not be the main 
actors in the process. The legislation did not prohibit employee participation, but 
it did make the privatization process mandatory.
Recognizing the constraints of the previous privatization legislation, the model 
provided for a free distribution of up to 30% of total shares to employees, former 
employees, and citizens. Each employee or citizen would acquire DM400 per year 
of employment up to a limit of DM14,000 free of charge only after the completion 
of the sale (70%). This was supposed to pacify resistance and give the employees 
a stake in the privatized firms.
The companies that had embarked on privatization in the previous period 
were stopped from distributing shares in the second round, but transferred 
the remaining shares into the Share Fund. The Share Fund was to sell these 
undistributed shares at the request of the Privatization Agency, with the idea that 
their value would be based on the market value determined on the stock market. 
The Share Fund was obliged to sell these shares, either on the stock market or by 
auction, within six years.
The Privatization Agency was to run the privatization process and to be divorced 
from the Ministry. Its main task was to promote, initiate, carry out, and control 
the privatization process. The Ministry was to participate in the forming of tender 
commissions, oversee the process, and set policy.
4. THE MODEL AND INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE
The model adopted was by its very nature incompatible with its objectives. The 
basic flaws were embedded in the model of sale and tender. By definition models 
based on sale, with the expectation of significant revenue, need a market with 
a strong demand side. This was obviously lacking. The first interest in tender 96
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privatization came from some of the foreign firms that had already shown interest 
under the Miloševićregime, the most prominent example being Lafarge.
The firms that were attractive for purchase were profitable, cheap by western 
standards, and could be easily restructured. Most of these were in the sectors 
of cement, breweries, steel, and similar enterprises. The goal was either cheap 
acquisition and/or market share. This is, of course, natural, since it is easy to sell 
off good firms as opposed to those which are less profitable or on the verge of 
bankruptcy. Acquisitions by foreign flagship companies were also supposed to 
be a sign that Serbia was business friendly with a pro-business government, thus 
hopefully attracting new investors into the privatization process.
The tender process itself was more or less straightforward, in the sense that 
only legal entities could bid and in this case large enterprises were the object 
of privatization. Certain firms might have an advantage, given that the tender 
conditions could be designed to favour certain large foreign enterprises. However, 
foreign consultants were part of the valuation process and helped to set the 
conditions of tender. The process was transparent and in the public spotlight, 
thus ensuring that the process itself would be completed without wrongdoing. 
The other disadvantage stems from the length of the process. In order for a firm 
to be sold it is necessary to establish a price. Therefore procedures required that 
firms be evaluated by licensed evaluators, after which a Dutch auction would be 
held. There were 7,000 firms that needed to undergo the privatization process and 
a limited number of evaluators, so the process would take time.
The government could not have a massive sale, achieve a favourable price, and 
complete, or even initiate, the process speedily. The government should have been 
aware of the limitations of the model, and should have sacrificed either the idea 
of a massive sale or the expectation that this process could be done with haste. 
Given what actually occurred, it fell short of both of its objectives. 
After becoming aware that the process of privatization was not moving rapidly, 
the model was amended in August 2002, changing the methodology of auction 
and of valuation of firms. These amendments were done through ordinances and 
fundamentally changed the rules which had guided the process to that point. 
Instead of valuation the starting price was determined by corrected book value, 
and the auction method was changed to the English auction or ascending bid, 
with the bidding starting at 80% of the determined value. PRIVATISATION IN SERBIA
97
This revision did speed up the process, as obviously speed had become the 
priority (Mijatović, 2005). Although the valuations might have reached prices 
that were too high, given the lack of demand, this was the very reason that Dutch 
auctions had been introduced. The corrected book value gave an advantage to 
insiders (mostly management), as they were in a better position to correctly 
estimate the firm’s real worth. In this way insider information became a more 
important factor than it would have been otherwise. In other words, an incentive 
was given to insider and management buy-out privatization, based on drastically 
asymmetric information,possessed by few. Insider employee and/or management 
buy-outs were what the original model was meant to avoid. The scrapping of 
valuation led to another problem not related to pricing, which could have been set 
independently. The lack of valuation practically eliminated basic due diligence, 
leading to problems of unrecognized contaminated assets, the true state of 
equipment, etc.; problems that surfaced after the completion of the privatization 
process.
The other disadvantage of this approach of starting at a low price (in general the 
book value is lower than that assessed through evaluation),was that in the public 
mind it was seen as a garage sale in which enterprises would be sold well beneath 
their true value. This planted a seed of resentment and grew the attitude that 
privatization amounted to theft. The explanation that the price was determined in 
a transparent process and was a market price did nothing to alleviate this broad-
based public perception:to the contrary, it has become even more widespread and 
ingrained.
The true flaws of the model, i.e., its application, were related to several 
interdependent institutional flaws, as well as the auction process itself. The 
institutional flaws related to :
1) Lack of adequate controls on money laundering and the origins of capital
2) The lack of legislation concerning restitution and
3) The lack of adequate valuation and regulation of urban land use. 
The first issue of dubious origins of wealth and potential money laundering were 
not adequately dealt with (Milovanović, 2007). The political issue of whether or 
not to allow the individuals who had enriched themselves during the 1990s by 
close ties with the regime and/or criminal activities was not really addressed. The 
only effort was made by Prime Minister Đinđić when he proposed alaw on ‘extra 
profit’. The central idea of this was to tax some of the individuals who had enriched 
themselves over the years of sanctions and war, and to thus make a clean break 98
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with the past. The idea was to settle the whole question of so-called ‘tycoons’. For 
various reasons of a political nature there was resistance,both from the governing 
institutions and from some of the wealthy individuals in question, and this effort 
failed. This has left Serbia with a problematic legacy that is still present today. 
Wealthy businessmen are seen as ‘tycoons’ or ‘entrepreneurs’, according to which 
is politically advantageous to the political actors. In the meantime the fact that 
Serbia has lacked a suitable and enforceable political party finance law over the 
last decade has lead to a widespread suspicion that there is a strong bond between 
wealthy businessmen and the political leadership which fosters corruption and 
shapes legislation.
That money laundering in the privatization process has not been adequately 
dealt with is worse. This has led to privatizations in which individuals widely 
suspected of criminal activity have used their wealth to purchase firms. This 
was apparent in cases at the very start of the privatization process, leading to 
understandable reservations on the part of the public regarding the process itself. 
The recent revelations of money laundering of narcotics trade revenues through 
privatization and/or the purchase of firms has only added to the widespread view 
that privatization is detrimental to society.That the latest estimates of the amounts 
laundered through privatization and/or purchase of firms run into hundreds of 
millions of euros certainly points to the failure of the government to monitor 
privatization and the economy.
The lack of legislation at the very beginning of the transition regarding restitution 
is understandable. Restitution needs consensus on adequate legislation, can be 
difficult to implement, and requires funds that are lacking. Furthermore, the 
government had numerous more pressing tasks to attend to. Nevertheless, the 
percentage of revenue from privatization proceeds ascribed at only 5% to the 
Restitution Fund should have been seen as inadequate. Certainly, no one should 
have nurtured the illusion that in the end restitution could be avoided or dealt 
with later in a symbolic way, making a mockery of the very idea that underlies 
it. This is also connected to the denationalization of urban land use, which has 
in its own way affected the privatization process. In truth, all the governments 
since 2000 had avoided facing the issue, until the current government was forced 
to come up with a proposal under pressure from the EU accession process; 
restitution being one of the major issues that needs to be conceptually dealt with 
as a condition for obtaining candidate status.
Finally, urban land use turned out to be a major motive in privatization in many 
cases, thus making the purchase and future of certain firms almost a side issue. PRIVATISATION IN SERBIA
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The inherited system did not ascribe urban land to the firms that occupied it, but 
rather gave them use instead of ownership. As urban land had been nationalized, 
the issue is closely linked to restitution. The failure to deal with this issue proved 
to be one of the major flaws in the privatization process. Although it does not 
make sense for industrial plants and storage facilities to be placed on prime 
urban land, nor does it not make sense to neglect it in the valuation of the firms.
The logical way was probably to transfer the land to the firms, thus adding value 
to the firms to be privatized. At the same time a large part of the estimated 
value of the land could be ascribed to the Restitution Fund, thus providing for a 
broader base from which to address the issue. This should have been a clear option 
from the very beginning. What occurred was that in a large number of cases 
privatization was pursued for the sole purpose of acquiring urban land use for 
further development and building real estate, mostly apartments, at a huge profit. 
The lack of regulation in this area opened the way to potential and real large-scale 
corruption, insider information dealing. and bribes for building permits. That 
the original model neglected this potential outcome proved to be one of its major 
flaws. There is no easily available data on the number of firms purchased for this 
sole purpose, but it certainly deserves to be on the research agenda.
Above all, the auction process itself was fundamentally flawed in several ways. 
The most important of these had to do with the existence of what basically came 
down to dual prices. In effect, participants in the auctions could be either legal 
entities that were obliged to pay the price attained by auction immediately, or 
individual citizens who had the opportunity to pay in six yearly instalments. 
Obviously this leads to dual prices, individuals getting the benefit of a lower price 
by being able to postpone payment into the future at zero interest (although the 
price was set in euros). 
The fact that all the individual buyer had to provide was a letter of guarantee 
from a bank or cash, had deep and dire consequences for the whole privatization 
process. At that point in time the origin of wealth did not come under scrutiny. 
This led to some individual purchases of firms by individuals being used as 
proxies for other wealthy businessmen who wished to remain out of the spotlight. 
In some cases, as we see now, some of these purchases were used for money 
laundering; i.e., making illegal wealth legitimate. There were also management 
and employee buy-outs, in which individuals took on personal debt. The major 
flaw of this model was that after the first instalment(or at any point further down 
the road till full payment), the new owners could simply drop out of the process 
by not meeting scheduled payments. It can be assumed that in a significant 100
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number of cases it was the property and tangible assets of the firm that were of 
main interest to the bidders. Even if, for example, the firm was later dislocated 
and the urban land used for residential construction, this usually meant that the 
buyer would be getting the firm for free and achieving a huge profit without any 
significant improvements in the firm’s capabilities or market performance.
This led to several types of fraud. One method was to use the firm as collateral 
in order to obtain more credit, pump out a large sum in cash, and purchase 
another firm in the privatization process, again as an individual. After that 
the first privatized firm could be returned to the Privatization Agency by not 
paying the second instalment. In the meantime, assets would be striped. Another 
approach would be to use the firm as a legal entity to purchase another firm in the 
privatization process(once again using the original first firm as collateral). The 
second purchased firm could again be used to obtain credit, which could then be 
used to either repay the individual debt on the first firm or to purchase another 
in the on-going quick paced process of privatization. This led to the formation of 
conglomerates that were based on a type of Ponzi scheme.
Further research should look at the price bid in relation to the starting price and 
the subsequent fate of the privatization process on a case-by-case basis. There is 
reason to suspect that behind the very high bids, tangible assets (for example,office 
space) or urban land use were the primary motives. It would also be worthwhile 
to see whetherthere is a high correspondence between high privatization bids 
and the subsequent annulment of contracts with the Privatization Agency.
5. CONCLUDING FINDINGS
Looking at Table 1, we can see that some of our broad hypothesis concerning 
the auction process cannot be dismissed at first glance. The prices reached at 
auction in the case of annulled privatizations were 43% above the book value, 
while for the others they were below book value with the price to book value 
ratio at 0.90. Searching through the Privatization Agency database we found that 
approximately 40% of annulled auctions were due to failure to meet instalment 
payments for the privatized firms.
On the other hand, those individuals who were not in the privatization process 
for dubious reasons had an on-going obligation to maintain core business 
economic activity at the level reached at the time of purchase. This was meant 
to preserve employment, but it actually put a lot of the strain on management, at PRIVATISATION IN SERBIA
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times becoming an impediment to restructuring. In fact close to 25% of annulled 
privatizations were due to the new owners not keeping the level of activity of the 
core business, or more generally not preserving the continuity of the business. 
This is worth looking into more seriously, as in some cases there might have been 
good reason for broader adjustments due to market conditions. In retrospect, 
some cases may have been due to mistakes on the part of the Privatization Agency.
Nor was the auction process immune from dealing in inside information. 
Obtaining knowledge of how many and which parties had shown interest in the 
auction of a certain firm could lead to price collusion. Furthermore, having the 
process proceedin a criminalized environment could lead to pressure on those 
that had shown interest and to extortion and racketeering. Finally, the failure of 
auctions for lack of a second bidder did not apply in the case of a second auction 
attempt. It is quite obvious that in that case the attained price would be extremely 
close to the starting price. In fact the data in Table 1,a summary of privatization 
results in the last decade, i.e., under the new model, support the conclusion that 
in the auction process the prices achieved were very close to book value.
A separate aspect, which we will not go into here for reasons of space, is the 
gaining of extra shares through the recapitalization process by investing in kind 
instead of cash. Specifically, this meant that appraised second hand equipment 
could be invested in the firm, increasing the number of shares of the owner 
and shrinking the proportion of minority shares, thus reducing their price for 
purchase at a later date. Protection of the rights of minority shareholders was 
practically non-existent. We shall not further pursue this issue here, nor shall 
we deal with the possibility of manipulating the shallow stock market in order 
to lower the price of shares pending a purchase from the Share Fund. Suffice it to 
say that such possibilities were present and should be a topic of further research.
The other results in Table 1 and Table 2 are in line with expectations. Again, stock 
market sales by the Share Fund had a high ratio of success (84%) in the firms 
that embarked on the process under earlier legislation. However, the price-to-
book value ratio was lower than in the other cases - 0.68. As these should have 
been the better performing firms this requires some explanation. One of them 
could be that prices might have been manipulated for the benefit of the majority 
shareholders.
Over all, the results are unimpressive. The initial success of tenders stands at 
41%. If we add the fact that 36 of these, whose combined value reached at auction 
was around 1/3 of the total tender sales, had their contract annulled, the only 102
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conclusion is that these results are unsatisfactory. In the case of auctions, although 
the success rate was somewhat higher (64%), the combined value reached at 
auction of those whose contracts were later annulled was around 50% of the total 
value reached in auctions. 
The investment and social programme obligations stemming from the 
privatization process were of some significance in the tender privatization, but of 
very little in the privatizations carried out through auction. These are presented 
in Table 2. They do not significantly change the overall conclusions, although 
some contracts were nullified due to non-fulfilment of the social programme 
(about 50 in all). 
Research on what actually occurred during the privatization process of the past 
decade requires an elaborate research agenda. This agenda should include not 
only the interaction of the flaws listed here, but also the effects on corporate 
governance, efficiency, product development, and other aspects of the privatized 
firms. Case studies would certainly be welcome. It is surprising that very little 
research has been done on this topic over the last five years, and we hope that 
this paper will inspire further research. This is important because privatization 
has not been completed. On the contrary, formerly privatized firms are being 
returned to state ownership and the Privatization Agency. Hopefully some lessons 
have been learned. However, given the record of the past decade and against the 
background of the last economic crisis, privatization as a process that society will 
benefit from will be extremely difficult to sell to a disenchanted public.PRIVATISATION IN SERBIA
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Table 2    Social Programme and Investment Programme Results  
in the Process of Privatization
Sum 2002-2011 Social Programme
(in 000 Euro) I/B S/B
Tenders (T) 276.689 1.01 0.30
Tenders –annulled 2.042 0.52 0.00
Auctions (A) 0.21
Auctions- annulled 0.22
Tenders + Auctions (T+A) 276.689 0.60 0.15
Stock Market(SM) 0 0.01
Stock mkt. previously annulled 
contracts (SMa) 0 0.00
Stock mkt. previously privatized 
(SMp) 0 0.00
TOTAL
T+A+SM+Sma+SMp
276.689 0.44 0.11
Source:  Privatization Agency of the Republic of Serbia
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